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Abstract 
By using the model of the score function (Sptcean, I.O. and Ghiorghi, L., 2012), the current research work aims to identify the 
degree to which the concepts, principles and techniques typical to Corporate Governance are spread, by taking 14 Romanian credit 
institutions as reference.   
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1. Introduction 
In the context of the new economy, the issue of corporate governance within the financial-bank system increases 
the interest of practitioners and European [COM(2010) 284 final] and world organizations, interested in promoting 
some international governance principles, either that we talk about the OECD principles, the recommendations of the 
Basel Committee in the bank field or community law (The Directive 2006/46/EC forces financial institutions classified 
on a regulated market to elaborate a corporate governance code which they have to abide by and to point out which 
are the parts of the code from which they derogate and the reasons for that). We do not aim to present the issues related 
to corporate governance within the bank system, where there already exist excellent observers (Mehran H. and others, 
2011, Mehran H. and Mollineaux L., 2012, de Haan J. and Vlahu R, 2013), but rather to make an analysis of the 
capacity of the Romanian bank system to abide by the provisions in the field of corporate governance.  
 In the Romanian legal system, both the laws in force (The Corporate Governance Code of the Bucharest Stock 
Exchange) and the most recent studies (Bunea M., 2013, Sptcean I.O. and Ghiorghi L., 2012) admit that, when it 
 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel: +40724372428 
E-mail address: m_manea7@yahoo.com (M. D. Manea)  
 5 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of Faculty of Economic Sciences, “Lucian Blaga” University of Sibiu”
455 Marinela-Daniela Manea /  Procedia Economics and Finance  27 ( 2015 )  454 – 459 
comes to dealing with the report conditions on the corporate governance applying to credit institutions, the following 
analysis pillars/axes are relevant for testing the degree of observing the principles typical to the field:   
1. governance and control structures of credit institutions, as well as their activity, paying a special attention to the 
Administration Board;  
2. the role of monitoring authorities and interest conflicts; 
3. the treatment of minority shareholders and the situation of interests owners;  
4. risks governance and adjustment of the internal control function to the risk profile of the institution;  
5. internal audit;  
6. ethics. 
Unfortunately, those involved in the Romanian bank system have not managed to really understand risks, so that 
several gaps of discontinuity and a strong lack of authority in terms of decisional factors have been registered, the 
immediate consequence being the creation of a considerable trust deficit in credit institutions; the fields particularly 
affected are: conflict interests, the effective enforcement of corporate governance principles, the role of monitoring 
authorities and auditors. In this context, in order to accomplish our objective, we have deemed necessary to expand 
our research, from the 6 pillars initially presented, to a thorough analysis and presentation of the concepts/attributes, 
building up a set of 10 hypotheses which are to be evaluated within the Romanian bank area. 
2.  Model  
The current study involves both a qualitative and quantitative approach, on the basis of the empirical data gathered 
out of a sample of 14 credit institutions. The qualitative side of the approach is explained by the fact that the study has 
required interpretations, explanations, understanding of the phenomena analysed, while the quantitative side has been 
focused on quantifications and numerical expressions, using a score system based on a function determined for each 
credit institution. The data collection phase has been based on techniques of mediated collection of information from 
the Corporate Governance Codes posted on the websites of the banks analysed, but also from the Published Annual 
Reports; the score function has allowed for transforming the data with an assertive and qualitative character into 
numerical quantitative data.  
The sample analysed is composed of four banks with Romanian capital: Banca Comercial Carpatica, Banca 
Transilvania, CEC Bank, EXIM Bank and by ten credit institutions activating within some international holdings: 
BCR, BRD, Unicredit, Volksbank, Raiffeisen, ING Bank, OTP Bank, Garanti Bank, Millennium Bank, Banca 
Româneasc.    
The research project proposed aims to identify the degree to which the Romanian credit institutions abide by the 
provisions of corporate governance, so as to maximize their performance. In order to achieve this goal, a set of 10 
hypotheses has been elaborated: 
Hypothesis No. 1: The Administration and Independence Board 
Hypothesis 2: Identifying the competences corresponding to the responsibilities taken upon by the members of the 
Administration Board.   
Hypothesis 3: Executive board accountable for and familiarized with bank risks 
Hypothesis 4: Adequate standards for remunerating the executive board 
Hypothesis 5: Treatment of shareholders and interests owners 
Hypothesis 6: The role of the Audit committee and internal audit risk oriented 
Hypothesis 7: The risks governance function 
Hypothesis 8: Adjusting the internal control function to the risk profile of the credit institution and monitoring 
operational objectives 
Hypothesis 9: Financial transparency and report 
Hypothesis 10: Ethical code 
By using the professional reasoning for the hypotheses mentioned above, we have assigned an importance 
coefficient k i , typical to each pillar considered to be relevant for the enforcement of corporate governance provisions 
in the Romanian bank system, as it can be seen in Figure no. 1.  
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Fig.1. Relevant  analysis axes and levels of importance associated to them within Corporate Governance 
Source: Author’s Projection 
 
Moreover, to each answer analysed from the statement “Enforce or explain”, and from the Published Annual 
Reports (according to the case) it has been assigned a distinct conformity mark  i , as it can be seen in Table no. 1.  
  
Table No. 1 The significance of the marks given to the information collected and interpreted 
Mark Significance 
0 The credit institution has not published any relevant document regarding CG (The Statement Enforce or explain, 
Annual reports) 
 
1 The credit institution has published satisfactory information (partial data, not-updated information) which do not 
allow for settling the cases related to CG and making recommendations.   
 
2 The documents regarding CG are found on the websites of the credit institutions analysed in a proportion of 70%; 
the information available allows for settling the cases/issues related to CG at a medium level. 
 
3 The dissemination of information meets the maximum of 100%, by offering complete transparent reports, which 
are also according to an efficient CG  
Source: Author’s Projection 
 
By starting from the importance coefficient k i  assigned to each pillar considered essential in the analysis initiated 
in the Romanian bank system, and from the marks  i  associated to each pillar, we have obtained the value of the 
score function F(x) (Sptcean I.O. and Ghiorghi L., 2012) for the 14 banks studied. The value of the score function 
shows the final mark assigned to each credit institution, in the form of an expression of conformity with the corporate 
governance instruments in the field, as it can be seen in Table no. 2. 
 
Table No. 2 Quantitative determinations regarding the conformity with the working hypotheses proposed 
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Source: Author’s Projection 
 
The equation used for the score function is: 
F(x) = ( ii xk  )x100/3   where,                                                                                                        (1) 
k i  – the importance coefficient assigned to each pillar of interest of corporate governance, on the basis of 
professional reasoning, 
 i – the mark assigned to the information collected and interpreted from the reports published, on the basis of the 
professional reasoning, inserted in Table No. 1, 
3 – maximum mark given. 
3.  Results  
Values of the score function: 
Banca Comercial Carpatica: F(x) = (5% x 3 + 5% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 15% 
x 3 + 10% x 3 + 10% x 3) x 100/3 = 100 
Banca Transilvania: F(x) = (5% x 3 + 5% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 3 + 
10% x 2 + 10% x 2) x 100/3 = 93,33 
CEC Bank: F(x) = (5% x 2 + 5% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 10% x 2 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 2 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 3 + 10% x 2+ 
10% x 2) x 100/3 = 83,33 
Exim Bank: F(x) = (5% x 1 + 5% x 2 + 10% x 3 + 10% x 2 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 2 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 2+ 10% x 3 + 
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10% x 2) x 100/3 = 78,33 
BRD: F(x) = (5% x 3 + 5% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 2 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 3 + 10% x 3+ 10% x 
2) x 100/3 = 91,67 
BCD: F(x) = (5% x 3 + 5% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 10% x 
3) x 100/3 = 100 
Raiffeisen Bank: F(x) = (5% x 2 + 5% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 10% x 2 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 2 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 2 + 10% x 
3 + 10% x 2) x 100/3 = 81,67 
Garanti Bank: F(x) = (5% x 2 + 5% x 2 + 10% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 2 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 3 + 10% x 2 
+ 10% x 2) x 100/3 = 85,00 
Volksbank: F(x) = (5% x 2 + 5% x 2 + 10% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 2+ 10% x 3 + 15% x 2 + 10% x 2 + 
10% x 2) x 100/3 = 80,00 
OTP Bank: F(x) = (5% x 1 + 5% x 2 + 10% x 3 + 10% x 2 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 2 + 10% x 3 + 
10% x 2) x 100/3 = 83,33 
ING Bank: F(x) = (5% x 1 + 5% x 2 + 10% x 3 + 10% x 2 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 
10% x 2) x 100/3 = 88,33 
Millenium Bank: F(x) = (5% x 1 + 5% x 2 + 10% x 3 + 10% x 2+ 10% x 3 + 15% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 2 + 10% x 
2 + 10% x 2) x 100/3 = 80,00 
Banca Româneasc: F(x) = (5% x 1 + 5% x 2 + 10% x 3 + 10% x 2 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 2 + 
10% x 2 + 10% x 2) x 100/3 = 80,00 
Uni Credit: F(x) = (5% x 2 + 5% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 2 + 10% x 3 + 15% x 3 + 10% x 3 + 
10% x 2) x 100/3 = 90,00 
With a score average of 86,79 out of a total of 100 points, only six entities were above the average (Banca 
Comercial Carpatica, Banca Transilvania, BRD, BCR, ING Bank, UniCredit). All the other did not overcome the 
average, as a result of the difficulties encountered in adjusting the internal control/audit function to the risk profile of 
the entity, the non-settlement of the independence issue of the members of the Administration Board, the promotion 
of standards which are not fit for remunerating the executive board, the partial/incorrect enforcement of the Ethical 
Code provisions.  
 Conclusions  
As the current research project is characterized by novelty (the enforcement of the governance concepts is only at 
the beginning in Romania), from the scores obtained by the credit institutions analysed it can be noticed, in a general 
approach, the interest paid by the leadership of banks and the parties involved (shareholders, employees and so on) to 
the basic structures/pillars of corporate governance. And even if some absences and flaws have been identified in 
enforcing the provisions/principles of corporate governance, as a result of the systemic risk encountered in the bank 
system, Romanian credit institutions are now on the path of implementing and going thorough into the basic 
concepts/pillars of corporate governance. 
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